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LABOR LAW: FIFTH CIRCUIT DETERMINES THAT
BREACH OF DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
In the first case in which the issue was the subject of an appeal, the
Fifth Circuit held that a labor union's breach of its duty of fair
representation -by racially discriminating among its members consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations
Act, and was therefore remediable by the NLRB. The court also
focused on the jurisdictional-relationship between the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the National Labor Relations Act, implying that
the'Act's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over unfair representation claims based on
racial discrimination. The court's resolution of these issues, how-
ever, points to the need for further congressional action in this
area.
A BARGAINING representative's duty of fair representation has been
firmly established under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Until recently, however, the manner in which this duty is to be en-
forced has not been delineated by the courts. Further, whether a
breach of the duty constitutes an unfair labor practice has similarly
remained unresolved. Raising both these matters, in Local 12,
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,1 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that such a breach does constitute an unfair labor
practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA2 and that, there-
fore, unfair representation is remediable by the NLRB.3 In positing
its solution to the jurisdictional problems of enforcing fair repre-
sentation, the United Rubber Workers court became the first federal
tribunal to focus on the relationship of the Civil Rights Act of
19644 to the NLRA and on the Act's potential conflicts with NLRB
powers.
The collective bargaining contract considered in United Rubber
Workers provided for plant-wide seniority without regard to race.
1 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967) (No.
194).
2 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8 (b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (b) (1) (A) (1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. The LMRA amended and added
to the NLRA.
3 See National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as NLRA].
'Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 716 (a)- (b), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1964).
However, Local 12 had maintained a policy of racially separate
seniority lists for nearly twenty years; and during 1960-61 the em-
ployer, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company of East Gadsden, Ala-
bama, laid off eight Negro employees while retaining less senior
white employees. The eight filed affidavits with the union grievance
committee alleging that their layoff had not been in accordance with
the seniority provisions. Although the committee refused to process
the grievances, the Negroes were reinstated when the president of
the- international union interceded at their request. Since Local 12
continued to refuse to process the Negroes' grievances concerning
segregated plant facilities and back wages for the layoff period, the
Negroes filed a charge with the NLRB.5 Contrary to the decision
of the Trial Examiner, the NLRB found that the employees' right
to fair representation had been violated by the union's refusal to
act." The Board concluded that fair representation is an indis-
pensable element of the LMRA section 7 rights which are protected
by section 8 (b) (1) (A)7 and that such a violation is remediable as
5 Since the grievance for backpay was derived from an alleged breach of the col-
lective bargaining contract, the eight Negroes probably could have brought suit under
§ 301 of the LMRA. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); LMRA § 301 (a),
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Section 301 (a) states: "Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . .. ."
Suit could not be brought under § 301 for the desegregation of plant facilities, since
the collective bargaining agreement did not deal with this subject. See 368 F.2d at 14.
On the other hand, the contract would support a § 301 suit if failure to process a
grievance concerning segregated facilities is deemed a prima facie violation of the
collective bargaining contract. For an analysis of the failure to process the grievance
as an unfair labor practice see notes 49-52 infra and accompanying text. Unfair repre-
sentation has been held to be a § 301 violation. See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335 (1964). Contra, 375 U.S. at 351 (concurring opinion of Goldberg, J.). See gen-
erally Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations: Unions,
Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 409-19
(1964); Comment, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair
Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26 U. Prnr. L. REV. 593, 594-96, 610-19 (1965).
0 Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 315-19 (1964).
7 Id. at 319-20. See LMRA § 8 (b) (1) (A). 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1964). Section
8 (b) (1) (A) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce"
employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Section 7 provides: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any and all such activities ....
LMRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964) (emphasis added).
The United Rubber Workers court did not address itself to the problem of what
constitutes "restraint or coercion," evidently assuming that unfair representation is
coercion under § 8 (b) (I) (A). See 368 F.2d at 17. Nevertheless, § 8 (b) (1) (A) arguably
promulgates a less stringent restriction on. unions than does § 8 (a) (1) on employers;
1038 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1967: 1037
Vol. 1967: 1037] LABOR LAW
an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b)(1) (A). Subsequently,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed."
When a union enjoying the status of exclusive representative of
all employees in a bargaining unit refuses to act on behalf of those
it represents or takes hostile action against any segment of those
employees for irrelevant or invidious reasons, it violates its duty of
fair representation. 9 Racial discrimination was the genesis of the
fair representation doctrine, 10 but the duty has been extended to
include any invidious discrimination not related to legitimate labor
union objectives." All discrimination among union members, how-
ever, is not prohibited since the union is allowed a wide range of
discretion in internal policies.' 2 While the duty applies to both
the former prohibits only union activity which "restrains" or "coerces" employees,
whereas § 8 (a) (1) prohibits employer activity which merely "interferes" with the exer-
cise of § 7 rights. See NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1960). Compare
§ 8 (a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1) (1964), with § 8 (b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A)
(1964). However, in pre-Taft-Hartley interpretation, employer interference which
did not also restrain and coerce had never been held illegal, and the Conference Com-
mittee's elimination of the word "interference" in § 8(b) (1) (A) codified this in-
terpretation of § 8 (a) (1). H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947). See also
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738 (1961);
notes 35-42 infra and accompanying text.
8 368 F.2d at 12. The NLRB had also found violations of § 8 (b) (2) (caused or
attempted to cause the employer to discriminate against complainants) and §8 (b) (3)
(refused to bargain in compainant's behalf). LMRA §§ 8(b) (2), (3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158 (b) (2), (3) (1964); Local 12. United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 317 n.5,
319-20 (1964). However, the Fifth Circuit did not reach the §§ 8 (b) (2) or (3) issues
since the NLRB's order was enforceable on the basis of the § 8 (b) (1) (A) violation.
11 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944); see Wallace Corp. v.
NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). See generally Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's
Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OmHo ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, The Worker
and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial Control of the Worker-
Union Relationship, 61 Micn. L. REv. 1435, 1469-72 (1963); Cox, The Duty of Fair
Representation, 2 ViLu. L. REv. 151 (1957).
For the possibility of a Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state judicial en-
forcement of discriminatory covenants prohibited by Fourteenth Amendment), con-
sideration in the area of unfair representation, see Comment, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 273,
285-87 (1965).
10 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (unfair
representation for union to use discriminatory bargaining device to oust Negro train
porters and replace them with white brakemen); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944) (unfair representation to discriminate against Negro firemen in favor of
white firemen).
12 Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (dictum); cf. Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335 (1964); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
12 In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Supreme Court em-
phasized the fact that the duty of fair representation does not preclude all distinctions
among the members of unions: "The complete satisfaction of all who are represented
is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory
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the negotiation and administration of a collective bargaining agree-
ment,13 the union may be allowed somewhat more discretion in
negotiating the agreement. 14
The duty of fair representation was first articulated in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 5 wherein the Supreme Court found
that concomitant to exclusive representative status under the Rail-
way Labor Act there was an implicit duty to represent all members
of the bargaining unit fairly.16 As a standard for future determina-
tions, the Court decreed that union members must be represented
"without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith."'I Relying on the reasoning of Steele, the Court, in Wallace
Corporation v. NLRB, 8 implied that section 9 of the NLRA similarly
imposes an obligation of fair representation upon the industrial
bargaining representative. Initially, the only remedy for breach
of the duty was judicial enforcement.19 Steele had reasoned that
bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete
good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Id. at 338; see
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 US. 192 (1944).
1s Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41, 46 (1957): "The bargaining representative's duty
[of fair representation] ... does not come to an abrupt end ... with the making of
an agreement between union and employer. Collective bargaining is a continuing
process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and
other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements,
and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract. The bargaining
representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions than
it can in negotiating a collective agreement."
14 See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 739-41 (1945).
1- 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
18 The Supreme Court recognized that valid differences might exist in the terms of
a contract, but declared that discriminations based on race alone "are obviously
irrelevant and invidious." Id. at 203. Following Steele, judicial relief was granted in
a number of cases for unfair representation under the Railway Labor Act. E.g., Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952).
17 323 U.S. at 204.
-8 323 U.S. 248 (1944). The Supreme Court stated that by selection of the union as
the bargaining representative under § 9 of the NLRA, the union became the agent of
all the employees and was implicitly charged with the "responsibility of representing
their interests fairly and impartially." Id. at 255. The duty of fair representation
was more explicitly extended to the NLRA by Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S.
892, rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953) (dictum). See also NLRA § 9 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1964).
29 Since the legal status of unions was derived largely from federal legislation,
governmental authority might have been expected to insure a fair exercise of power
over union members. However, at its inception, national labor policy showed a high
degree of solicitude for employees rights which were largely to the detriment of labor
organizations, but did not concern itself with employee rights within a union or
through a union. See Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51
(1917) (upheld "yellow dog" contracts); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E.
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a judicial resolution was mandatory since there were no provisions
for administrative remedies under the Railway Labor Act.20 Wallace,
which preceded the adoption of unfair labor practice remedies by
the NLRA, accepted the Steele remedial limitations.21 Since the
NLRB did not attempt to enforce the obligation of fair representa-
tion as an unfair labor practice until 1962, unfair representation
claims subsequent to Wallace and prior to 1962 were generally re-
dressed in the courts.22
The NLRB, however, did employ sanctions against illegally dis-
1077 (1896) (picketing that interferes with employees who are not picketing is unlaw-
ful). After the passage of the Railway Labor Act and the NLRA, the policy shifted to
a preoccupation with the formation of unions and the operation of collective bargain-
ing as a basis of labor-management relations. See LMRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964);
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964); The Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
Implicit in this shift was the assumption that employee interests were synonomous
with those of the union representing them. See A. Cox & D. BOK, LABOR LAw 915
(1965). Therefore, at first the only real safeguards against unfair representation came
in the form of state remedies such as sanctioning arbitrary disciplining of union
members, e.g., Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 P. 992 (1918); Polin v. Kaplan, 257
N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931), ordering an accounting of funds, see, e.g., Dusing v.
Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 263 App. Div. 59, 31
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941); Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
119 N.J. Eq. 230, 244-45, 182 A. 37, 45 (Ct. Ch. 1935). See also Duke v. Franklin, 177
Ore. 297, 302-04, 162 P.2d 141, 143-44 (1945); Wilson v. Miller, 194 Tenn. 390, 250 S.W.2d
575 (1952), and requiring and supervising union elections of officers, see, e.g., Wilson
v. Miller, supra; Sibilia v. Western Elec. Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 59 A2d
251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); O'Neill v. United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 348 Pa.
531, 36 A.2d 325 (1944); Raevsky v. Upholsterers' Int'l Union, 38 Pa. D. & C. 187
(Phila. C.P. 1940). See generally Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union De-
mocracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 609, 624-27 (1959); Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union
Elections, 70 YALE L.J. 1221 (1961). The usual underlying legal theory of state
judicial action is that the union constitution is a contract between the union and its
members and thus is enforceable in the courts. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, supra at
281-82, 177 N.E. at 834. See generally Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What
the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
20 323 U.S. at 207; see Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S.
232, 239 (1949); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 322 U.S. 210, 213
(1944).
21 See 323 U.S. at 255. Unfair labor practice prohibitions and remedies were not
enacted until 1947, while Wallace was decided in 1943.
22 See, e.g., Republic Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 (1964); Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden,
373 U.S. 690, 696 n.7 (1963); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g 223
F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The NLRB
apparently felt initially that it did not have the power to enforce fair representation
under § 8 (b) (1) (A). See Case No. K-311, 37 L.R.R.M. 1457 (1956); Case No. 1047, 35
L.R.R.M. 1130 (1954). In an Amicus Curiae Brief to the Supreme Court, the NLRB
stated: "[L]egislative history .. .does not indicate that Congress contemplated that
the right of employees to receive fair and equal treatment from their bargaining repre-
sentative would be brought within the scope of that protection." Brief for NLRB as
Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
criminatory representation before 1962 through refusing to aid
offending unions to become or remain exclusive bargaining repre-
sentatives under section 9 by revoking certification and abrogating
the contract bar rules.23 However, these measures were ineffective
against strong unions to which certification has little practical sig-
nificance.24 Further, since the individual employee was afforded
no direct relief,25 these sanctions had little practical effect and were
seldom employed. 28
2.See NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964). The NLRB actively invokes indirect
remedies for unfair representation on the theory that since it grants certification as
exclusive bargaining agent under § 9, it can police these grants. Three forms of action
are available under this approach: (1) revocation of certification, see, e.g., A.O. Smith
Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957); (2) abrogation of the contract bar rule in certain
instances, see, e.g., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962); and (3) refusal to certify
unions that are likely to represent unfairly. Refusal to certify remains merely a
theoretical remedy, for it has never been invoked. However, its use is advanced
by Professor Sovern with the argument that, "while the Board cannot properly take
steps merely to compel unions to admit Negroes, it can properly act to ensure that it
validates as exclusive bargaining representatives only unions likely to discharge their
statutory duties." Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimina.
tion, 62 COLUM. L. Rav. 563, 600 (1962). A denial of certification would be consistent
with the NLRB's policy of setting aside elections tainted by appeals to racial
prejudice. However, such a refusal would be effective only against weak unions since
a strong representative could thrive without certification by the NLRB. See Sherman,
Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L.
REv. 771, 782-84 (1965); Sovem, Race Discrimination and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR 3,
7 (1963). See generally Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Dis-
crimination, supra at 596-604.
Another possible remedy which has never been invoked for unfair representation
would be to order the company to withhold recognition of the union (in NLRB
terminology-to disestablish the union). However, this remedy, which has only been
applied to company dominated unions, is authorized by § 10 (c), and applies only to
unfair labor practices. If unfair representation is an unfair labor practice, the NLRB
has more appropriate remedies such as cease and desist orders. Therefore, disestab-
lishment is not feasible in the unfair representation situation. See H.J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1941); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303
U.S. 261, 266-68 (1938); NLRA § 10 (c), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (1964). See generally A.
Cox & D. Boa, supra note 19, at 247-61.2 1 See Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 VAND. L. Rxv. 547, 558-59 (1963); Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 VIL.- L. Rxv. 151, 175 (1957); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
711, 714 (1964).
25See Note, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 711, 714 (1964).
' Decertification or the threat of it has been used to promote fair representation in
several instances. See, e.g., A.O. Smith Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 621 (1957) (revoked
because union failed to represent 18 workers); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 111 N.L.R.B.
1210 (1955) (threatened decertification); Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945)
(same); Carter Mfg. Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 804 (1944) (same). See generally Albert, supra
note 24, at 558-63. Abrogation of the contract bar rule has also been used to en-
courage fair representation in a few instances. See, e.g., Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
54 (1962) (held contract with certified union was no bar to new election because of
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The NLRB first asserted jurisdiction over unfair representation
as an unfair labor practice within the ambit of section 8 (b) (1) (A) in
Miranda Fuel Company.27 A truck driver for Miranda was reduced
in seniority by the union because he had left work on a leave of ab-
sence three days earlier than provided for in the contract. He com-
plained to the NLRB that the union was acting arbitrarily in deroga-
tion of his interests. A majority of the Board held that the reduction
of seniority violated sections 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2).28 On appeal,
the Second Circuit denied enforcement of the NLRB's order, but
without an express majority rejection of the Board's section 8 (b)(1)
(A) theory.29 Two judges did not pass upon the Board's theory;30
and a third, Judge Medina, rejected it on the ground that unfair
representation not related to union membership cannot support a
finding of an 8 (b) (1) (A) violation.31 He reasoned that since sections
8 (b) (2), 8 (b) (3), 8 (a)(3), and 8 (a) (5) were intended to affect only
union considerations, Congress must have intended that the applica-
tion of section 8 (b) (1) (A) be limited to conduct affecting member-
ship in a union.3 2  While the NLRB has nevertheless extended its
discriminatory conduct); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., supra (certification revoked
and contract held no bar to new election); cf. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
See generally Albert, supra note 24, at 563-81.
27 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), modified, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
" LMRA § §8 (b) (1) (A), 8 (b) (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (b) (1) (A), (b) (2) (1964). Section
8 (b) (2) provides that it is an unfair labor practice "to cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of" § 8 (a) (3), which prohibits
"... discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condi-
tion of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organzia-
tion .... "
29 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
80 Chief Judge Lumbard concurred with Judge Medina, but upon the belief that
the evidence did not show unfair representation and, therefore, it was unnecessary to
pass upon the NLRB's §8 (b) (1) (A) theory. 326 F.2d at 180. Judge Friendly declined
to pass on § 8 (b) (1) (A), as he felt the union had violated § 8(b) (2). Id. at 180-81 &
n.l.
31 Id. at 175.
82 Id. at 175-76. Judge Medina reasoned that since § 8 (b) (3) is merely the counter-
part of the employer's duty to bargain collectively under § 8 (a) (5), and since § 8(b) (2)
and § 8 (b) (3) require a showing of discrimination that encouraged or discouraged
union membership, to constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8 "the union or the
employer must have committed some act the natural and foreseeable consequence of
which is to be beneficial or detrimental to the union." Id. at 176. His reasoning
closely paralleled that of the dissenters in the NLRB opinion: "Even assuming
arguendo that the Section 9 duty of fair representation can be read into Section 7, it
does not follow that the prohibitory provisions of Section 8 (a) (1) or 8 (b) (1) (A), or even
all the provisions of Section 8, provide a remedy for all the incursions upon those
rights, or make the Board the exclusive guardian of those rights." 140 N.L.R.B. at
200.
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8 (b) (1)(A) theory to other unfair representation cases, 83 United
Rubber Workers is the first case in which the theory has been the
subject of an appeal.34
In United Rubber Workers, the Fifth Circuit upheld the NLRB's
position that the duty of fair representation comprises an "indis-
pensable element of the right of employees 'to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing,"' as guaranteed in
section 7.85 Since section 8 (b) (1) (A) makes it an unfair labor
practice to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights, the union violated that section when it failed to
fairly represent the employees.38 Rejecting Judge Medina's position
in Miranda,37 the Fifth Circuit decided that section 8 (b) (1) (A) is
not restricted to discrimination that encourages or discourages union
membership: 8 the other section 8 provisions, though limited to
On the other hand, most courts have construed § 8 (b) (1) (A) to encompass a wide
range of conduct. E.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 731 (1961) (union accepted exclusive bargaining authority when only a minority
of employees had authorized the union to represent their interests); Communications
Workers v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 479 (1960) (union coerced employees in the exercise of their
right to refrain from or discontinue participation in a strike); Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (employee coerced in his statutory right to refrain from
observance of union rules); NLRB v. United Packinghouse Workers, 274 F.2d 816 (5th
Cir. 1960) (unlawful violent conduct during strike); NLRB v. International Wood-
workers, 243 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1957) (threats of violence during strike). However,
some courts have defined limits for the section by ruling that there is no "restraint or
coercion" under specific circumstances. E.g., NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S.
695 (1961) (hiring only union men is not illegal per se); Local 357, International
.Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 US. 667 (1961) (hiring hall arrangement is not
illegal per se); NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters, 362 U.S. 274 (1960) (peaceful picketing
of minority union for recognition is not conduct that "coerces" employees in the exer-
cise of their § 7 rights).
s See Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Local 1367,
Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), aff'd, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
36 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967) (No. 212). In the latter case, the NLRB found
a § 8(b) (1) (A) violation because a union maintained a 75-25% work distribution
between two racially segregated locals and enforced a "no doubling" arrangement
forbidding the assignment of white and Negro gangs to work together in ship hatches.
In Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1575 (1964), the issue was whether a jointly
certified union had breached its duty of fair representation when it refused to process
the grievance of a Negro member of the bargaining unit who also was a member of
the other jointly certified union. Applying the Miranda theory, the majority of the
NLRB found violations of § 8 (b) (1) (A) and § 8 (b) (2). See International Union, UAW,
149 N.L.R.B. 482 (1964).
3,368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967)
(No. 194).
"Id. See note 7 supra.
"368 F.2d at 17.
'7 See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
368 F.2d at 20.
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union considerations, should not be allowed to limit the section 7
rights enforced by section 8 (b) (1) (A).39
Some commentators have argued that the absence of any specific
legislative authorization, coupled with the rejection of specific pro-
posals to include the duty,40 is indicative of an intent not to impose
this representational obligation.41  Conversely, other commentators
reason that since Congress enacted unfair labor practices after the
Supreme Court had ruled in Wallace that the duty of fair representa-
tion is implicit in the NLRA, Congress impliedly adopted an unfair
labor practice remedy for unfair representation.4 2  Nevertheless, the
89 Id.
,0 See Note, 63 MIcu. L. REv. 1081, 1085 (1965); Note, Administrative Enforcement
of the Right to Fair Representation: the Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 711, 719-21
(1964). The LMRA added § 8 (b) (1) (A) to the NLRA and amended § 7 to include as
a protected right the refraining from participation in any activity covered by § 7. It
has been hypothesized that the amending sequence indicates that the proscription of
§ 8 (b) (1) (A) was apparently a counterpart to the original § 8 (a) (1) of the NLRA,
which imposed the same restrictive limitation on employers. Since § 8 (a) (I) does not
contain a duty of fair representation for employers, the correlative theory would
compel the conclusion that there is no duty of fair representation in § 8 (b) (I) (A).
See Note, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1081, 1085 (1965); Note, 112 U. PA. L. Rav., supra at 719-20.
NLRB jurisdiction over unfair representation charges has been opposed on the
basis that it would conflict with policies concerning jurisdiction, see notes 74-85 infra
and accompanying text; the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see notes 60-74 infra and accom-
panying text; and the LMRA, see Note, 112 U. PA. L. Rav., supra at 722-23.
11 See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 22, at 792; Sovern, Race Discrimination and the
National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH ANNUAL
CONF. ON LABOR 3, 13 (1963). See generally Note, Administrative Enforcement of the
Right to Fair Representation: the Miranda Case, 112 U. PA. L. RFv. 711 (1964). But
see Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 1509-11; Comment, A Union's Duty of Fair Repre-
sentation: Historical Support for Administrative Enforcement, 2 Housw. L. REv. 373,
381-86 (1965).
" A corollary to the argument that unfair representation is an unfair labor prac-
tice is the contention that if Congress had meant to exclude the duty of fair representa-
tion from § 8 (b) (1) (A), it should have explicitly stated that fair representation was
not a part of § 7. Professor Sovern maintains that an actual "vehicle" for the expression
of any such intent by Congress existed. In referring to a clause in § 7 of the NLRA
which reads: "Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein," he stated, "only the words 'or to represent unfairly' needed to be
added to assure a contrary result in Miranda. This does not, of course, establish a
legislative intent in support of Miranda. The point is only that Congress' intent is
unclear or, more realistically, nonexistent." Sovern, Race Disrimination and the
National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH ANNUAL
CONF. ON LABOR 3, 13-14 (1963).
In Comment, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair
Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26 U. P-rr. L. Rv. 593 (1965), four arguments
are presented which allegedly support a finding of unfair representation as an unfair
labor practice: (1) The courts have not satisfactorily discharged the government's
obligation to the individual employee; (2) Because the NLRB is the "trustee" of the
nation's labor policy, its effort to eliminate an existing evil should receive greater
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only conclusion properly drawn is that the legislative intent is un-
clear. A more convincing justification for the Board's inclusion of
unfair representation within the section 8 (b) (1) (A) prohibitions
accepts the premise that much deference is given the NLRB's imple-
mentation of any policy not in conflict with the provisions or pur-
poses of the NLRA or other federal legislation.43
After positing that unfair representation is unfair labor practice
under section 8 (b) (1) (A), the United Rubber Workers court appears
to debilitate the doctrine of broad union discretion, including dis-
crimination among members, in order to facilitate their repre-
sentation. 44 The Fifth Circuit's analysis implies that the scope of
representational discretion will be viewed more restrictively in the
administrative stage of the bargaining contract than in the negotia-
tion stage. 5 A decision not to process a grievance must be based
upon criteria with a "'reasonable relation to the Union's role as
bargaining representative or to its functioning as a labor organiza-
tion.'-46 To determine the constituents of a "reasonable rela-
tion," the court concludes, with apparent acceptance of the Steele
rationale,47 that where evidence indicates that a grievance would
have been processed to arbitration "but for arbitrary and discrim-
inatory reasons," the refusal to process is a violation of the union's
duty to provide its members with representation that is fair, im-
partial, and in "'good faith.' ",48 The necessary implication of the
court's analysis is the rather forceful position that in every instance
where racial discrimination is asserted, assuming arbitration is avail-
able and the movant's claim appears meritorious, the union must
process the grievance to avoid a presumption of unfair representation.
In light of the nature of the grievances which the United Rubber
consideration than that of a private litigant; (3) The NLRB can point to instances
where the courts have made similar broad policy decisions when faced with much
stronger arguments of contrary legislative intent; and (4) Since Congress gave no indi-
cation that the duty was not in the statute and since the Supreme Court found a
duty, there is no need for an explicit mandate for a correlative right to be enforced
by the NLRB. Id. at 605-06.
"3 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691-92 (1951)
(NLRB's interpretation and application of the NLRA in doubtful situations is to be
given weight).
"1 Compare note 12 supra, with notes 13 & 14 supra.
"5 See 368 F.2d at 17.
"6 368 F.2d at 19 (citing 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 317).
47 See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
48 368 F.2d at 19.
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Workers court deemed unreasonable, however, it is probable that
the court intended only to follow Steele and, in so doing, over-
stressed their conclusion without considering its implications.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that unfair representation did exist
because of the union's failure to process grievances of the eight
Negroes concerning backpay and segregated facilities. Following the
Steele standard, the court ruled that the backpay grievance would
have proceeded to arbitration "but for arbitrary and discriminatory
reasons." 49 Much more difficult to rationalize, however, is the finding
of unfair representation for failure to process the grievance con-
cerning segregated facilities. The court deemed segregated facilities
to be "conditions of employment" and implied that the union has
an affirmative duty to bargain on discriminatory practices.50 Render-
ing racially discriminatory employment procedures a mandatory
bargaining subject is without significant precedent. Further, such a
per se requirement appears inappropriate since unions are usually
allotted much greater discretion as to the most efficacious use of their
bargaining power in negotiating contracts.5' Moreover, a primary
difficulty is the absence of standards delineating the circumstances
under which a union may represent the views of a majority of its
members which endorse suppression of minority interests.
A more flexible position would allow that where a contract is
nondiscriminatory and no extra-contractual arrangement to segre-
gate exists, a union has no positive duty to demand desegregation but
need only administer the contract fairly and bargain for adequate
facilities for all its members. 2 Otherwise, unions in effect become
partially civil rights organizations fulfilling a governmental function
more appropriately left to forums such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Arguably, requiring unions to insist
upon desegregation would be detrimental to industrial tranquility,
for advocacy of such a social view could weaken a union's position
"0 368 F.2d at 19.
0Id. at 19-20. Since the Goodyear segregated facilities were not dealt with in the
collective bargaining contract, the holding that a meritorious grievance may arise from
their existence implies that the union had an affirmative duty to bargain over them.
11 See notes 12 & 13 supra.
52 See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 Viir. L. Rav. 151, 156 (1957) (the
duty of fair representation does not impose upon unions "the affirmative obligation of
making reasonable efforts to abolish racial discrimination"). See generally Sovern, The
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 563,
578-84 (1962).
with the majority of its members and, ultimately, perhaps greatly
impede unionism in the South.
Nevertheless, sanctioning unfair representation as an unfair labor
practice more closely effectuates congressional and national policies
than does the rejection of such a remedy. NLRB intervention
offers certain advantages to both public and employee interests.
The public benefits from the resulting industrial harmony. The
employee realizes adjudicatorial advantages from the NLRB's broad
powers of investigation," the NLRB's power to encourage informal
settlements, the lack of litigation charges," and the possibility of
earlier settlements which prevent lengthy terms of unemployment. 0
Furthermore, the spotty history of recovery for court suits based
upon unfair representation indicates that the employee has a greater
chance of recovery before the NLRB. T
58 The NLRB's investigatory powers are detailed in § I1 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 161 (1964). See Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 1514-17; Comment, Refusal to Process
a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption,
26 U. Prrr. L. Raw. 593, 605-06, 618 (1965). But see Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. R1v. 563, 611 (1962).
" See generally id.
5 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-.16 (1966).
58 See Comment, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB, and the Duty of Fair
Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593, 618 (1965).
" Professor Sovern reports that Negroes have gone to the courts to redress unfair
representation on an average.of less than once a year since Steele was decided. He
attributes this dearth of litigation to the expense of counsel and adjudication. Sovern,
Race Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of
Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR 5-6 (1963).
From 1944 to 1964 Negro plaintiffs claimed approximately 6,000,000 dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages, but collected only 2,802 dollars in compensatory
and 3,000 dollars in punitive damages. Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine:
An Effective Weapon Against Union Racial Discrimination, 24 MD. L. REv. 113, 144
(1964). There are several reasons for the meager judicial enforcement. A heavy
presumption of regularity in union affairs impedes a plaintiff's case. See Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 US. 330 (1953). Further, courts have erected procedural
and technical barriers which adversely affect the employee-litigant. These include
insistence upon pleading technicalities, application of doctrines which limit an em-
ployee's right to sue a union, imposition of a requirement that contract remedies be
exhausted, and hesitation in allowing arbitration to protect the employee. Blumrosen,
supra note 9. One explanation for these reservations on the part of the courts is
that they are unable to find standards by which to test the fairness of economic dis-
tinctions in collective agreements. See Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair
Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1357 (1958). Arguably then, less than adequate
judicial enforcement would disappear as soon as standards were provided.
If the overall statistics of the NLRB in unfair labor practice cases were applied to
unfair representation cases, approximately 66% of the cases would be withdrawn or
dismissed before issuance of a complaint, about 25% would be settled or adjusted
without need of a trial examiner's decision, and only 6% could go to the NLRB for a
decision. 30 NLRB ANN. RaP. 9-11 (1965).
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Perhaps the most persuasive practical argument against granting
NLRB jurisdiction is that the public purpose of the NLRB in
encouraging union-management cooperation may be achieved at the
expense of the private interests of a majority of a local's members.58
The Fifth Circuit, however, maintains that the NLRB can best
determine the proper balance between public and private interests.59
Moreover, since an unfair representation dispute would arise within
a labor context, the NLRB is logically the best equipped agency
to strike this necessary balance.
Noting that the claims of the union workers arose three years
prior to the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,60 the
United Rubber Workers court implied that the Act's Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) would not have had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such claims.61 There is no doubt that the
Commission is a competent body to which a grievant with an unfair
representation claim arising after the effective date might turn. Title
VIII of the Act makes it an "unlawful employment practice" for a
union to discriminate against "any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" or to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to do so. 62 Title VII's proscription clearly en-
compasses a potentially broad spectrum of action which might be
classified as unfair representation. 63
Because of the pervasiveness of this jurisdictional grant, a number
of commentators contend that the EEOC should have exclusive
competence over the various forms of unfair representation to which
the Act applies. 64 Congress inserted specific provisions in the Civil
" See Blumrosen, supra note 9, at 1516. Many in the labor field would dispute the
assertion that the NLRB is more expert than the courts in handling unfair representa-
tion cases. See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 COLUM. L. Rav. 563, 611 (1962).
" 368 F.2d at 23-24.
00 The claims in United Rubber Workers arose more than three years prior to the
effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act-July 2, 1965. See § 716 (a)- (b), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
61 §§ 701-16 (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1964).
12 §§ 703 (c) (1), (8), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (c) (1), (3) (1964).
08 Significant aspects of unfair representation remain without Title VII. See, e.g.,
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (seniority rights); NLRB v. Miranda Fuel
Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (same); cf. Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d
658 (6th Cir. 1961) (dismissal of part of group because of thefts by the group as a
whole).
64 Professor Sherman concludes that the Civil Rights Act preempts the NLRA in
overlapping areas. Sherman, supra note 23. Contra, Comment, 65 COLUm. L. REv.
273, 282-85 (1965).
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Rights Act to force complainants to bring their suits for discrimina-
tion first under state law; only after these suits have failed may the
plaintiffs resort to the EEOC. 5 Since Congress failed to express
explicitly a similar intention as to federal remedies, these com-
mentators reason that federal labor remedies were impliedly super-
seded.66 However, it has also been argued that the NLRB should
have concurrent jurisdiction on the ground that Congress merely
intended to supplement all previously existing remedies with the
Civil Rights Act.6
The above interpretations of the relationship between NLRB
and EEOC jurisdiction, however, ignore the possibility that the
respective competencies of the agencies are integrally related.
Buttressing this view is the traditional presumption in statutory
interpretations that, whenever possible, federal statutes should be
construed so as to avoid a conflict." A construction which har-
monizes the two jurisdictional grants can realistically posit the
EEOC's broad focus on discrimination against private parties69 as
a complement to the NLRB's specific duty of effectuating national
labor goals even at the expense of articulated private interests.70
An unfair representation dispute pivoting on allegations of racial
discrimination is an instance of intertwining public and private
interests. Since various ramifications of national labor policy, in-
cluding the extent of a union's discretion, would necessarily be raised
by a claim of this nature, the NLRB is arguably a more appropriate
forum than the non-adjudicatory EEOC to consider these broad
implications. To the degree that the NLRA and prior NLRB de-
0- §§ 706 (b), (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (b), (c) (1964). Subsection (c) provides that:
"TiThe Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify
the appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable
time ... to act under such State or local law to remedy the action alleged."
88 See Sherman, supra note 23, at 805.
47 See, e.g., Comment, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 273, 282-85 (1965).
as See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1935); United States v. Jefferson
Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386 (1934); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933); Mussel-
man Hub-Brake Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1943); Miller v. United
States, 13 F. Supp. 684 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); Kleinfelter v. United States, 318 F.2d 929
(Ct. Cl. 1963); cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779 (1952); United States v.
Stewart, 311 US. 60 (1940).
e9 Compare note 19 supra, with Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1964).
70 See, e.g., Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 US. 177 (1941); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940). See generally
Note, 1966 DuKE L.J. 841.
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cisions do not provide guidelines by which to determine the precise
components of unfair representation of a racially discriminatory
nature, the Board could appropriately take special note of standards
articulated by the EEOC and by the courts in adjudicating con-
troversies involving the civil rights legislation.7 1
Allowing direct interaction of the Civil Rights Act and the NLRA
solves many of the problems confronting- either exclusive or con-
current jurisdiction. The possibility of a double standard for ad-
judication raised by allowance of concurrent jurisdiction would be
avoided since the NLRB would apply the Civil Rights Act deter-
minants of discrimination in the context of national labor policy.7 2
Viewing the jurisdictions as complementary would also preserve the
range of more effective NLRB enforcement mechanisms which would
be forfeited if claims based on the Civil Rights Act could be asserted
only in court proceedings.1 3
In addition to the interpretive problem outlined above, defining
unfair representation as an unfair labor practice engenders other
remedial questions. Arguably, recognition of discriminatory repre-
sentation as a violation of section 8 (b) (1) (A) removes the jurisdic-
71 For the NLRB to accept EEOC standards for ascertaining a racially-generated
unfair representation would be a step seemingly comporting with the logical implica-
tion of a statement of the Supreme Court in the Steele decision: "We think that the
Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as
exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the
Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those
for whom it legislates." 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). Thus, if the Civil Rights Act of
154 represents the legislative discharge of the above legislative duty, then Congressional
intent articulated in the Act and judicial construction of its provisions are appropri-
ate authority on which the NLRB could base standards to be applied in particular
unfair representation controversies. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2
ViLL. L. REV. 151, 166 (1957); note 73 infra.
72 It may appear that two bodies whose main orientations are so far apart would
not develop similar standards. However, if the NLRB can concentrate on its primary
function-collective bargaining-and at the tame time take advantage of the EEOC's
expertise in the civil rights field, then there is not a conflict in standards but a
resulting "double expertise." Senator Humphrey stressed the importance of EEOC's
maintaining an expertise in its specific a-rca in debate over the Civil Rights Bill. See
110 CoNG. REc. 14,188 (1964).
73 Unlike the EEOC, the NLRB can issue cease and desist orders and can seek
judicial enforcement of its orders. NLRA § 10 (c), (e), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c), (e) (1964).
The EEOC is not entitled to initiate a civil action on behalf of an aggrieved party,
but can only seek to remedy the discrimination through informal methods of concilia-
tion. §§ 706(a), (e), (f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-:-5 (a), (e), (f) (1964). The entire NLRB
procedure would probably provc more favorable to aggrieved parties since the NLRB
can investigate complaints, conduct hearings, issue findings, and seek enforcement. See
NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). See generally Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair
Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REv. 771, 805 (1965).
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diction of the courts to directly enforce fair representation, a power
which has existed since Steele and Wallace under the somewhat
tenuous theory that an absence of administrative remedies left the
courts as the sole adjudicatory body. 4 Yet, it is possible that Ford
Motor Company v. Huffman,75 and other cases involving claims of
unfair representation decided subsequent to enactment of the unfair
labor practices, could be construed as holding that the courts retain
jurisdiction whether or not unfair representation is an unfair labor
practice. However, the Supreme Court held,78 subsequent to the
above cases, that in situations in which an unfair labor practice may
be involved, the courts must defer to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. 77
Nevertheless, the Court has recently indicated that fair representation
is an exception to the doctrine of preemption with resulting con-
current jurisdiction in the courts and NLRB. 8
On the other hand, since Congress has explicitly preserved
judicial power under section 801 (a),79 an overlap between NLRB
7" See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
-345 U.S. 330 (1953).
is San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
1 "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted." Id. at 245. This principle of exclusive NLR.B jurisdiction is based upon
two factors: (1) In 1947, when Congress added restraints on unions to the existing
restraints on employers, it adopted a comprehensive code of substantive law relating to
labor relations that forecloses the application of any potentially conflicting substantive
law. See id. at 243-45; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1953);
Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial
Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. Ray. 1435, 1517-18 (1963).
(2) Congress evidenced a preference for federal administrative enforcement of the
code, to the exclusion of other methods of enforcement, by purposely placing admin-
istrative responsibility in the NLRB. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959): ". . . Congress has entrusted administration of the labor
policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own
procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experi-
ence . . . ." The Court further stated that: "When the exercise of state power
over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the dearly indicated
policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States
from acting .... " Id. at 243. "When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the
activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield." Id. at 244. See
Garner v. Teamsters, supra at 490: "Congress evidently considered that centralized
administraiton of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform appli-
cation of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies."
78 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 176-88 (1967).
TO NLRA § 301 (a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Section 301 (a) provides: "Suits for viola-
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and judicial jurisdiction may still exist. Further, interpretation of
that section has affirmed that courts can entertain the claim of an
aggrieved employee which is based essentially on a breach of con-
tract, even though it might also involve an unfair labor practice.8 0
Thus the Fifth Circuit concluded that there would be concurrent
jurisdiction if a claim of unfair representation involved a breach
of contract."' In cases where the unfair representation involves no
breach of the bargaining contract, assuming unfair representation
is not construed as a prima facie breach, 2 the NLRB would have
exclusive jurisdiction if no other federal statute were involved. 3
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployees .. .may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties ..... ." Judicial power is also reserved by Congress under
LMRA § 101 (4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (1964) ("No labor organization shall limit the
right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court ....') and NLRA
§ 303 (b), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964) (awarding of damages for illegal secondary boycott).
In addition, the courts have preserved state injunctive power where labor disputes lead
to violence. Further, the states may compensate for the consequences of conduct
marked by imminent threats to public order. International Union, UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634 (1958); see United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954). Injunctions have also been allowed against such conduct. Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
351 U.S. 266 (1956). "State Jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the
compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of
domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed Congressional
direction." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
"See Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
"' The United Rubber Workers court interpreted the previous cases to hold that
where a violation is of a "hybrid" nature-breach of contract and an unfair labor
practice-the employee is free to invoke the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB or to
proceed in the courts. 368 F.2d at 22. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
197 (1962): "The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which
also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not
exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court in suits under § 301."
82 Compare Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), with id. at 351 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). See generally Comment, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NVLRB, and
the Duty of Fair Representation: A Plea for Pre-emption, 26 U. Prr. L. Rxv. 593
(1965).
88 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The United
Rubber Workers court felt exclusive NLRB jurisdiction was desirable, since the
aggrieved employee would no longer have to shop for a proper forum. 368 F.2d at
22-23. Previously, the plaintiff first had to go to the NLRB if his claim was based
essentially on an unfair labor practice, though couched in terms of breach of contract,
but had to begin anew in the courts if the NLRB concluded that the only violation
involved in his claim was a breach of the duty of fair representation. Local 100,
United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 (1963): "In the present case
the conduct on which the suit is centered, whether described in terms of tort or
contract, is conduct whose lawfulness could initially be judged only by the federal
agency vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction to apply federal standards."; accord,
Local 207, Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). However, the plaintiff would
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However, the Fifth Circuit provides no guide to distinguish situa-
tions in which the NLRB is simply construing a collective bargaining
contract to ascertain if there is an unfair labor practices4 from those
in which the interpretation will involve determination of the con-
tractual rights of individual employees.8 5
Although the NLRB's conclusion that a section 8(b) (1) (A)
violation existed in United Rubber Workers presents an appealing
mode for policing unfair representation, such a remedy may not
be the most appropriate one currently available. However, if the
jurisdictional and policy problems can be satisfactorily resolved
judicially, section 8 (b) (1) (A) may become the most efficient alterna-
tive. 8 In the absence of adjudicatorial resolution of these problems
to the preservation of minority interests, Congress should re-enter
this statutory area, denominate section 8 (b) (1) (A) as the appropri-
ate remedy, and provide broad policy guidelines for NLRB juris-
diction.
not necessarily have to begin with the NLRB if he brought his suit under § 301. See
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) . Of course, these jurisdictional problems
would not exist if the NLRB is deemed to have jurisdiction over unfair representation
under § 8 (b) (1) (A), for the NLRB would not be forced to defer to judicial jurisdiction.
84See NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385-U.S. 421 (1967).
85 See generally Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76
HARv. L. Rxv. 529 (1963).
"s Since the fifth circuit covers most of the southern states, unfair representation
as an unfair labor practice could prove highly useful in supplying an easy and expedi-
ent method of protecting Negroes from unfair representation and yet not arouse
regional hostility since the protection is not the product of a "civil rights" organization
such as the EEOC.
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